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Countries  differ in whether they charge clients for different
forms  of birth  control,  offer them  free,  reward  people  for using
them, or penalize  people  for not using them.
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Govenmments  in developing countries - con-  Turkey, on the other hand, charges for
cemed about rapid population growth and the  sterlization  but provides IUDs, pills, condoms,
rising costs of family plarning programs - face  and diaphragms free.  Jordan charges for the
difficult ethical and practical considerations in  IUD and offers the pill free.
deciding how to recover costs yet stimulate
family planning.  Some countries offer community incentives
for achieviLng  family planning goals.  Some offer
Policies vary widely. Sri Lanka, for ex-  families incentives for remaining small.  Several
ample, charges for pills and condoms, offers  countries, especially in Asia, impose penalties
IUDs and injectables free, and pays the acceptor  on families that exceed the norm.
for sterilizadon.
W-at practical and ethical considerations
Pakistan and the Republic of Korea charge  shape these policies? This paper reviews current
for resupplies of pills, condoms, and spermicide  practices and policies in developing countries
and pay the acceptor for sterilization. Bangla-  and considers the ethical issues that each kind of
desh and Nepal give resupply methods free and  incentive and disincentive raises.
pay the acceptor for sterilization (and, in Bang-
ladesh, for using the IUD).
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VI S>AUuoouj  puS 'siuauAUd  'smUO  0The financing  of health  care  and  family  planning  programs  has
become  a  matter  of international  concern  as national  budgets  for  social
services  have  been  reduceu  while  demands  on those  services  have increased
(Abel-Smith,  1985;  Arellano,  1987;  and  Cornia  et al.,  1988). Cost  pressures
grew  with  the  oil  crisis  of the  1970s  and  the  debt  crisis  of the  1980s,  and
foreign  aid  from  developed  colntcies  has  declined  in  real  value. Where
public  funds  are  diminishing,  concern  ham  been  raised  as to  the  source  of
support  for  "Health  for  All  by the  Year  2000"  and  for  family  planning
programs--either  as part  of or separate  from  the  health  sector.  This
concern  has  led  to  suggestions  that  user  fees  be instituted  or increased--at
least  for  those  who  are  able  to  pay, that  communities  play  a greater  role  in
providing  services,  and  that  the  private  sactor  be  more involved  in  the
provision  of services  (World  Bank,  1987).
However,  where  family  planning  is  concerned,  issues  other  than
cost  are  involved. The  threat  of rapid  population  growth  is so  great  in
some  countries  that  economic  rewards  are  offered  to encourage  couples  to
have  fewer  children  or to  adopt  contraception  or sterilization.  Other
countries  consider  it  a basic  human  right--akin  to  the  right  to  health
care--to  have the  number  and  spacing  of  children  desired,  and they  provide
contraceptives  free  to  enable  people  to  enjoy  that  right.
Thus,  a  variety  of  monetary  policies  regarding  contraception
exists  around  the  world. These  range  from  high  user  charges  in  some
countries,  to free  contraceptives  in  many,  to incentives  and  disincentives
in others. This  paper  examines  these  policies,  focuses  on charges  and
payments  as they  existed  in  early  1988,  looks  at the  consistency  of  monetary
policies  within  countries,  and  considers  the  ethical  issues  raised  by each
kind  of incentive.2
The data  in  this  paper  come  principally  from  a 1987  questionnaire
inquiry  to the  100  developing  countries  having  populations  over  one
million. At the  time  of this  writing,  responses  were in  from  65  countries,
with  most  nonresponses  concentrated  in the  countries  with the  least
programmatic  activity,  chiefly  in  Africa  and  the  Middle  East. A large
amo'int  of secondary  data  has  been  used  to  supplement  the  survey,  including
information  from  a  historical  series  created  by Nortman  (1985  and  prior
yecrs),  beginning  in 1969  and  containing  data  through  1983. Nortman's  data
have  never  been  computerized  or aggregated  into  a si  wle  time  series;  we
have  done  that  and  have combined  it  with  another  h  cal  series  for
sterilization  information  (Ross  et  al.,  1985). Our  qu:-stionnaire  updates
both  series  for  1984  onward  and  adds  a few  additional  variables.
A  xology
Since  considerable  confusion  exists  in  defining  cost  measures,  we
begin  with  a  basic  typology. The  distinctions  made  here  are  observed
throughout  the  paper.
First,  payments  are  made  to:  (a)  acceptors,  (b)  providers,  and
(c)  recruiters,  all  focused  on the  act  of accepting  a  method  (usually
sterilization).  These  payments  may  be in  cash  or in  kind  and  are  usually
given  immediately  upon  acceptance.  They  vary in  amount,  and  on this
variation  rests  much controversy.  A small  payment  merely  replaces
out-of-pocket  costs  and  thereby  removes  a  barrier,  whereas  a large  payment
can  be a strong  inducement  to an  act  that  would  otherwise  not  have  occurred3
or  would  have  occurred  later. In  between  is  an ambiguous  zone,  complicated
by the  fact  that  a fixed  payment  may  be trivial  to some  but significant  to
others. Payments,  when  small  and  trivial,  are  not  properly  termed
incentives.  Some  payments  and  gifts.  on the  other  hand,  have clearly  been
large  enough  to  act  as true  incentives,  and  have  been intended  to do so.
A second  category  is  the  opposite  of the  first--charges  to the
client  for  contraceptive  supplies  and  services. Subtypes  exist  according
to  whether  the  context  is  a public  program,  a social  marketing  scheme,  or
the  commercial  sector.
Third  are "community  incentives"--inducements  offered  to  units
small  eno-ugh  to  have  a sense  of group  identification.  These  are  directee,
for  example,  at a  mothers'  club,  a  village,  or a local  administrative  area--
again,  one  small  enough  to  possess  the  basic  sense  of community. Some
incentives  involve  rewards  only  to the  group,  such  as a  new  well  or
irrigation  system;  others  offer  rewards  to individuals  but  are  still  given
under  community  auspices  and  influence.  Such  measures  take  various  forms
and  have  occurred  mainly  in  pilot  projects,  although  China  and  Indonesia
have  implemented  them  on  a national  scale.
A fourth  type  of cost  measure  consists  of incentives  and
disincentives  directed  at the  general  population  (as  distinct  from  small
groups). These  are  oriented  directly  to  fewer  births,  as  distinct  from
inducements  to  practice  contraception.  Some  involve  benefits  (or  penalties)
tied  to  the  nth  child: salary  level,  tax  exemptions,  maternity  leaves,
eligibility  for  preferred  housing,  schools,  and  so forth. These  have  been
used  chiefly  in  Asia,  but tax  and  maternity  measures  appear  to a surprising
extent  in  other  regions  as  well.4
Charges  and  Payments  for  Contracegtive  Use
Public  Programs
Depending  upon  the  country  and  the  method,  the  person  adopting
contraception  through  a family  planning  program  may  have to  pay  for  it,  may
get  it free,  or  may  receive  a paymentl  from  the  program.
Most  programs  about  which  we have  information  provide  methods
free,  especially  in  Africa,  as shown  in  the  middle  column  of  Table  1. While
most  African  countxies  with  public  programs  probably  do give  contraceptives
free,  many  of the  program  efforts  are  weak  and  their  coverage  is limited.
Other  programs  charge  the  acceptor  (column  1),  though  usually  a small
amount.
Still  others  pay  the  acceptor. In  Asia,  six  programs  pay the
acceptor  for  sterilization  (column  3),  even  though  they  charge  for  other
methods  or give  them  free. Bangladesh  also  pays  IUD  acceptors,  as does
India. We know  of no  program  that  pays  the  acceptor  for  any  other  methods.
How consistent  are  countries  in thcir  charges  or payments  for  the
various  methods? Many,  in fact,  treat  different  contraceptive  methods
differently.  Although  come  policies  appear  inconsistent  and  highly  varied
on the  surface,  they  may  reflect  conscious  policy  decisions. For  example,  a
country  that  wants  to  encourage  sterilization  might  offer  incentives  for  the
procedure  and,  at the  same  time,  provide  other  contraceptives  free  of charge
or  even  at a small  cost.  Some  inconsistencies,  however,  have  no apparent
rationale.
Countries  that  are  consistent  in that  they  offer  all  methods  free
(to  the  extent  that  they  provide  them  at all)  include  Chad,  Ethiopia,5
Liberia,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Sudan,  Togo,  and  Zimbabwe  in  Africa;  China,
Indonesia,  and  the  Philippines  in  Asia;  Colombia,  Costa  R -a, Jamaica,
Mexico,  and  Paraguay  in  Latin  America;  and  Egypt,  Morocco,  and  Tunisia  in
the  Middle  East.  Some  countries  or economies  are  consistent  in the  other
direction,  by chargi  -or  every  method  that  they  offer;  these  include
Botswana  in  Africa,  Hot.g  Kong  and  Taiwan  (proviaice  of  China),  in  Asia,  and
Peru  in Latin  America  (where  there  is  a small  standard  charge  for  all
Ministry  of  Health  services;  no charge  for  social  Security  Services).
Countries  with inconsistent  cost  structures  fall  into  the  various
possible  types:
o  Sri  Lanka  charges  for  orals  and  condoms,  offers  IUDs  and
injectables  free,  and  pays the  acceptor  for  sterilization.
o  Pakistan  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  charge  for  resupply  methods
(these  include  orals,  condoms,  and  spermicides)  and  pay the  acceptor  for
sterilization.  (Korea  also  provides  menstrual  regulation  free  to
low-income  women,  and  charges  for  the  IUD.)
o  Bangladesh  and  Nepal,  on the  other  hand,  give  resupply  methods
free (as  well  as injectables  in  Bangladesh),  and  pay  the  acceptor  for
sterilization  (and  for  the  IUD  in Bangladesh).
O  Turkey  is  unusual  in  charging  for  sterilization,  while  providing
IUDs,  orals,  condoms,  and  diaphragms  free. Jordan  charges  for  the  IUD  and
offers  the  pill  free.
Thus,  every  pattern  is  represented.  Two  countries  fall  into  all
three  columns  of Table  1 (Korea  and  Sri  Lanka),  and  at least  two  countries
fall  into  every  combination  of two  out  of the  three  columns. Moreover,
nearly  every  method  is  offered  free  in  some  country,  and  is  provided  for  a6
fee  in  others.
What then  can  explain  these  various  inconsistencies?  The  apparent
reason  that  certain  countries  in  Asia  make  payments  to sterilization
acceptors  is  that  this  method  involves  only  a single  act  and  has  a
permanent  demographic  effect. Payments  also  take  into  account  that
sterilization  is  exceptional  because  it involves  a  period  of reduced  work
activity. Some  covntries  no doubt  charge  for  the  pill  because  they  incur
fairly  large  costs  for  the  resupply  and  logistics  involved;  this  is  often
true  for  condoms  as  well.  Certain  inconsistencies  can  be explained  by the
donor  practice  of giving  some  commodities  free  but  not  others. For  clinical
methods,  sometimes  the  attempt  is to  recover  some  medical  costs. In  other
cases  the  rationale  is  to  make  all  methods  free  to encourage  their  use.  On
the  contrary,  some  countries  may  charge  for  all  services  on the  grounds  that
free  scrvices  are  not  appreciated.  Different  countries  take  different
positions  on the  various  methods. Some  are  too  poor to  have  much  choice;
the  Ghana  government  has felt  that  it  cannot  afford  to  give  free  ssrvices,
and  so  has  instituted  small  charges  for  contraceptives  and  minor  health
commodities.  On the  other  hand  Thailand  removed  charges  for  oral
contraceptives,  largely  to  help  meet its  demographic  targets.
What  are  the  amounts  involved,  for  charges  or  payments  to
acceptors? As seen  in  Figure  1,  the  pill  is  provided  either  free  or at a
price  up to  US$.60  equivalent,  and  is  almost  always  sold  for  well  below  the
commercial  price  in the  same  country. Higher  charges  for  oral
contraceptives  are  made in  Ethiopia  and  the  more  economically  advanced  Asian
economies  of Hong  Kong,  Taiwan  (province  of China),  and  Singapore. For  the
IUD,  as seen  in  Figure  2,  the  highest  charges  occur  in  Jordan,  Singapore,7
and  Hong  Kong.  (Note  the  small  payment  made  to the  IUD  acceptor  in
Bangladesh  and  India.)  Sterilization  charges  (Figure  3),  where  they  are  made
at all,  are  of course  higher  than  those  for  any  other  method. The  small
charges  in  Turkey  ano  Singapore  are  exceptionally  low,  and  sterilization  is
free  in  Morocco  and  Mexico. Among  the  countries  in  which  a  payment  is  made
to the  acceptor  of female  sterilization,  Korea  is  a special  case:  a large
payment  is  made  to low-income  acceptors  of sterilization.  Acceptors  receive
US$45  if they  have  more than  two  children,  $;10  if two  children,  and  $330  if
one  child. These  amounts  are  somewhat  less  significant  than  they  may  appear
given  the  relatively  high  per  capita  income  in  Korea,  but  they  are  offered
only  to persons  of low  income. The  other  countries  make  smaller  payments  to
the  sterilization  acceptor,  but such  payments  gain  importence  against  the
background  of the  acceptors'  lower  per  capita  incomes.
The  charges  for  vasectomy  (not  shown)  are  less  than  those  for
female  sterilization  in  Taiwan  (province  of China)  and  Hong  Kong,  but for
the  other  countries  or  economies  shown  the  charges  are  essentially  the  same,
even  though  the  real  cost  of  vasectomy  is  a good  deal  less  than  that  of
tubectomy.
Provider  Pavments
Some  programs  also  pay  the  provider  a  per-case  fee,  which  may
encourage  higher  acceptance  rates. The  regional  pattern  for  provider
payments  appears  in  Table  2.
The  African  countries  all  fall  into  the  first  column,  making  no
per-case  payments  at all. On the  other  hand,  some  Asian  countries  do make
such  payments,  and  they  do  so to all  categories  of family  planning8
personnel. Most  Latin  American  and  Middle  Eastern  countries  make  no pa'ent
to  providers. None  of tbem  appears  in the  sterilization  column,  perhaps
chiefly  because  of strong  feelings  against  sterilization  payments.
Burma,  Laos,  Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  and  Thailand,  in  Asia,  do  not
pay  providers  on a  per-case  basis,  nor  does  the  much  different  Chinese
system. However,  other  Asian  countries  pay  some  or all  providers  for
various  methods. In  general,  the  same  Asian  countries  that  pay the  client
for  sterilization  also  pay  the  providers  on a  per-case  basis,  and these  tend
to  be the  very  large  or densely  populated  subcontinent  couzV  S. Where
provider  payments  exist,  the  physician  is  nearly  always  paid  for
sterilization,  IUD  insertion,  and  the  provision  of the  pill--except  in
Taiwan  (province  of  China),  where,  for  ITD  and  sterilization  cases,  only  the
fieldworkers  are  paid.  The  nurse  or  midwife  is  also  often  paid  for  all
three  methods,  as are  the  "other'  personnel  (usually  a fieldworker  of some
type). Unfortunately,  the  available  data  do  not  clearly  designate
recruiters  except  in the  'other'  category,  but  Bangladesh  and  India  are
prominent  among  the  few  countries  that  have  tried  making  per-case  payments
to  recruiters  of  various  types. Countries  that  pay  providers  at all  pay  not
just  one  but  generally  two  or three  of the  different  personnel  categories.
The  amounts  paid  to  providers  are  quite  modest,  for  the  most
part. However,  the  equivalent  of  US$5 in  Nepal  and  even  US$.60  in
Bangladesh  to  the  physician  for  tubectomy  are  said  to  have  a  motivating
effect  as cases  accumulate  over  a  month  or  more,  and  certainly  each  amount
must  be judged  within  its  own  cultural  context.
Providers  who  receive  incentives  may  also  include  officials  and
administrators  (who  are  'providers'  only  in  an indirect  sense). They  may  be9
given  quotas  for  numbers  of acceptors,  'ometimes  separately  for  each  method,
or targets  for  totel  prevalence  of  contraceptive  use.  Promotions,
transfers,  and  salary  raises  may  depend  partly  upon  meeting  targets. From
one  standpoint,  these  goals  are  no  different  from  the  expectations  in  many
public  and  private  enterprises.  However  they  may  develop  into  very  strong
pressures  especially  when they  are  combined  with incentives  offered  to
individuals.
We turn  now  to the  charges  for  contraceptive  supplies  in
non-program  settings. Charges  within  three  contexts  were  mentioned  at the
outset: public  programs  (covered  in  the  preceding  section),  social
marketing  plans,  and  the  commercial  sector. The latter  two  now follow.
Social  Harleting  Plans
We included  in  our  questionnaire  a few  items  on social  marketing
programs, 2 and  obtained  estimates  of  prices  from  that  and  from  other
sources.  The  results  appear  in  Table  3.  It should  be borne  in  mind that
the  programs  vary  greatly  in  character  and  in their  manner  of subsidizing
contraceptive  products. Some  channel  products  chiefly  to  private  doctors,
others  to retailers. Some  use  nonprofit  agencies  and  others  only the  purely
commercial  sector. The  plan  of  Taiwan  (province  of  China)  works  only
through  factories;  in  Colombia  (not  shown)  one  plan involved  sales  to
private  doctors,  through  orders  by  mail.
Large  differences  in  price  also  exist  for  the  same  contraceptive
method,  even  within  the  same  country. Two-  and  three-fold  differences
within  countries  appear  for  the  condom  in  Bangladesh.  Sri  Lanka,  Thailand,
and  Mexico,  and  large  differences  exist  in the  price  of  orals,  as  well.10
Across  countries  the  variation  is  even  greater--for  example,  from  US$.08  to
US$5.16  for  E  dozen  condoms,  and  from  US$.1l  to  US$1.26  for  one  cycle  of the
pill.  Some  of these  variations  reflect  quality  differences,  as  with
condoms;  some  reflect  product  procurement  from  different  sources--for
example,  international  versus  local  manufacturers;  and  some  reflect  a
variety  of other  causes.
The  Commercial  Sector
We now  turn  to  commercial  prices,  paid  in the  marketplace  for
resupply  methods,  oi  paid  to  private  doctors  for  sterilization  or the  IUD.
(Minimum  prices  are  used in  this  discussion  to avoid  the  complexity  of
dealing  with  ranges,  and  because  the  mass  of poor  consumers  will  usually
gravitate  to the  low  price. The  figures  that  follow  use  the  only  price
given  when a  country  did  not  report  a range.)
The  outstaalding  feature  of commercial  prices  is  their  vast  range
across  different  countries,  even  within  the  same  region. One  cycle  of the
pill  ranges  from  less  than  US$.05  to  over  US$4 (Figure  4).  The  IUD (Figure
5) costs  from  less  than  US$.17  (in  Indonesia)  to over  US$70,  and  up to
US$150  in  Puerto  Rico  and  US$300  reported  for  one  African  country,  Cote
d'Ivoire. The  same  extreme  variation  appears  for  the  other  methods,  whether
clinical  or  not--private  sector  sterilization  costs  (Figure  6)  vary  widely,
as  do condom  prices  (not  shown),  up to  US$5  to  US$6  or  more  per  dozen.
These  differences  no doubt  reflect  duty  charges,  high  prices  due
to scarcity,  and  othler  factors. In  Africa,  of  course,  costs  to the  consumer
relative  to the  Pverage  income  are  comparatively  greater  than  in those  Asian
countries  where  per  capita  income  is  much  higher.11
To summarize,  these  data  furnish  new informatioa  on the  costs  of
contraceptives  in  public  family  planning  programs,  in social  marketing
programs,  and  in the  commercial  (private)  sector. They also  cover  the
payments  made for  contraceptive  adoption  to  both  clients  and  providers.
There  are  very large  differences  among  countries,  and  very  different  forces
that  govern  the  decisions  of  how  much to  charge,  or pay,  for  different
methods.
Community  Incentives
Community  incentives  are intended  to create  a sense  of social
responsibility  within  the  group  to  practice  family  planning. In  both  China
and  Indonesia  local  government  units  have  been  given  goals  and  offered
benefits  or  prizes  for  the  best  performance  records. In  China  the  local
employment  unit  bears  most  of the  responsibility  for  making  the  promised
payments  to  one-child  families. In Indonesia  loan  funds  have  been given  to
acceptor  clubs  to  manage;  loans  can  go to  any  community  member  but  club
members  manage  the  fund  and  so  gain  prestige. In  India  several  states  have
offered  awards  to  village  councils. The  awards  range  from  cash  to a  bag  of
cement  for  each  vasectomy  performed. In  1983  the  Indian  government
announced  an expanded  program  of  benefits  to community  groups,
manufacturers,  and  labor  unions  to  reward  contraceptive  performance.  In
1983  the  Bangladesh  government  announced  that  it  would  begin  to  give  cash
awards  to  districts  that  achieved  family  planning  goals  (but  these  may  never
have  been implemented,  and  in  any  case  districts  are  too  large  to  possess  a
sense  of  community).
A recent  community  incentives  pilot  program  in  Thailand  tied12
family  planning  incentives  to  a village  revolving  loan  fund  (Weeden  et al.,
1986). In  this  plan,  the  villages  received  a  US$2,500  loan  fund;  family
planning  users  were  allowed  to  apply  for  larger  loans  than  nonusers,  shares
in  the  fund's  profits  from  interest  were larger  for  those  who  used  more
effective  family  planning  methods,  and  additional  grants  to the  village  were
predicated  upon  an increase  in  contraceptive  prevalence.
Incentives  and  Disincentives  for  Small  Families
Incentives  to  have small  families  go  beyond  a one-time  payment  for
adopting  sterilization  or an IUD. The  objective  is  not  to remove  barriers
to  contraceptive  acceptance  or to  induce  people  to  accept  a specific  method,
but,  rather,  to  create  the  motivation  to limic  family  size  by providing
advantages  to families  who  have few  children  and/or  punishments  to those  who
exceed  a specified  number.
This  approach  is  used  most  extensively  in China  and  the  smaller
states  of East  Asia.  In Singapore,  the  first  three  children  get  a choice  of
schools  and,  until  recently,  parents  having  two  children  or less  got
priority  for  government  flats. In  China,  where  the  government  is promoting
the  one-child  family,  benefits  are  the  largest  and  most  varied,  and  they
differ  considerably  from  province  to  province. In  general,  children  in
one-child  families  receive  priority  in  health  care  and  in admission  to
schools,  and  their  parents  are  eligible  for  improved  housing,  better  jobs,
an  additional  monthly  stipend,  more  land,  and  eventually  higher  pensions.
In Indonesia  a generous  monthly  rice  allowance  is  given  to  every  government
employee  for  every  family  member,  but  only  through  the  third  or fourth
child. In  the  Republic  of  Korea,  families  with two  or fewer  children13
receive  preference  for  medical  care  and  public  housing,  and  older  people  who
have  only  two  children  receive  higher  pensions. (In  addition,  as mentioned
above,  payments  are  made  to low-income  people  who  choose  to become
sterilized.)
A great  deal  of ingenuity  has  been  shown  in  devising  ways to
benefit  parents  of small  families. For  exa&ple,  in  India  in the  early
1970s,  a  no-birth  bonus  scheme  was  devised  for  workers  on the  tea  estates.
A payment  was  made  into  a savings  account  for  each  month  of  nonpregnancy.
The  account  was  redeemable,  with  5  percent  compound  interest,  at the  end  of
the  woman's  childbearing  ysars. However,  50  to 100  rupees  were to  be
forfeited  if the  woman  had  a third  child,  250  if she  had  a fourth  child,  and
the  entire  account  cancelled  on the  birth  of a fifth  child  (Ridker,  1971).
Similarly,  in  a small  pilot  trial  in  Taiwan  (province  of China),  families
with two  or fewer  children  had  money  set  aside  that  was  later  redeemable  for
the  education  of their  children. Of course  one  of the  problems  with
long-term  benefits  is  that  they  require  couples  to plan  for  the  future  and
have  confidence  that  the  government  or  business  will  deliver  on its
promises,  and  this  can  rarely  be assured.
Disincentives
A number  of countries,  particularly  in  Asia,  have  imposed
penalties  on families  with  more  children  than  the  established  norm.  In
China,  provinces  have  used  disincentives  on families  that  have more  than  one
child,  though  we understand  that  these  have  applied  only  to those  who signed
the  one  child  pledge. Among  these  disincentives  are  loss  of  health
benefits,  reduced  priority  in  school,  and  return  of  benefits  previously14
accrued. During  the  1960s  and  1970s  Singapore  enacted  a  wide ranging
program  of disincentives  which  includes  maternity  fees  that  escalate  with
parity,  lower  priority  in  choice  of schools  for  fourth-  or  higher-order
children,  and,  until  recently,  reduced  priority  for  government  housing.
During  the  1970s,  Indian  civil  servants  who failed  to  reach  their  quota  of
sterilization  acceptors  were  threatened  with loss  of  benefits. Recently,
the  National  Planning  Commission  of Bangladesh  announced  that  upazilas
(subdistricts)  that  failed  to  meet  nationally  established  family  planning
targets  would  have  their  development  budget  cut  by 5  percent.
A relatively  common  disincentive  is to  limit  the  number  of tax
deductions  for  children. Kenya,  for  example,  nermits  tax  deductions  only
for  the  first  four  children. Tax  deductions  for  children  have  been
completely  eliminated  ir  Nepal,  Sri  Lanka,  and  Tanzania. Some  countries--
for  example,  Cameroon--that  pay  child  allowances  limit  them  to a certain
number  of children. For  example,  Tunisia  gives  a family  allowance  to
parents  only  for  the  first  three  children. Similarly,  at least  eight
countries--  including  Ghana,  Singapore,  Republic  of  Korea,  and  Thailand--
limit  maternity  leaves  to  a specified  number  of  births.
Ethical  Considerations
Payments  and  incentives  to  encourage  contraceptive  use and  small
families  raise  a  number  of ethical  issues. We therefore  reexamine  here  each
category  of measures  defined  at the  outset  to  consider  its  ethical
features. First,  however,  some  general  remarks  are  needed  as  background.
Some  observers  consider  incentives  inherently  coercive,  reducing  freedom  of
choice  by offering  irresistible  rewards  or  pressures. Others  respond  that15
moderate,  positive  in-entives  shift  the  balance  of costs  and  rewards  and  so
serve  to increase  freedom  of  choice,  particularly  for  poor  people. The
range  from  the  simple  relief  of out-of-pocket  costs  to the  application  of
powerful  incentives  is  a  matter  of degree,  and  persons  of different  incomes
are  affected  differently.  The  ethical  judgments,  therefore,  become  shaded,
inviting  the  very  contentiousness  for  which  the  incentives  question  has  been
so  widely  noted.
A crucial  aspect  of the  ethical  dilemma  is  found  in the  tension
between  a  government's  proper  function  of  protecting  the  welfare  of current
and future  generations,  versus  the  right  of individuals  now  alive  to freely
determine  the  size  of their  families. This  tension  is  clearly  reflected  in
a well-known  paragraph  of the  World  Population  Plan  of  Action  (United
Nations,  1974):
All  couples  and  individuals  have the  basic  right  to decide  freely
and  responsibly  the  number  and  spacing  of their  children  and  to
have the  information,  education,  and  means  to  do so;  the
responsibility  of couples  and  individuals  in  the  exercise  of this
right  takes  into  account  the  needs  of their  living  and  future
children,  and  their  responsibilities  towards  the  community
(Isaacs,  1981:369).
The  contradictions  are  apparent: couples  and individuals  can
decide  "freely,"  but also  "responsibly,"  and  in  light  of other  "needs." As
with  most  other  human  rights,  the  fact  that  people  have  the  right  to
determine  the  number  and  spacing  of their  children,  does  not  mean that  the
government  can  never  infringe  it.  The  question  is  under  what circumstances,16
and in  what  ways,  government  can  ethically  take  action: in this  case,  to
reduce  childbearing  where  it  perceives  that  the  well-being  of the  community
or  of future  generations  is  endangered.
With regard  to incentives,  three  principles  may  provide  some
guidance. First,  the  right  of couples  and  individuals  to  determine  the
number  and  spacing  of their  children  takes  general  precedence.
Infringements  on  voluntarism  must  be justified  by a substantia]
demonstration  that  reduction  of  population  growth  is  urgent  and  necessary.
Governments  can  ethically  attempt  to  restrict  childbearing  by means  of
incentives  and  disincentives  only  in those  cases  where  continued  high
fertility  rates  threaten  the  well-being  of the  society  with severe  harm to
present  or succeeding  generations.  Some  indicators  of severe  harm  are
clearer  than  others. Candidates  include  malnutrition  or starvation,
widespread  depletion  of natural  resources,  and  such  extensive  unemployment
that  the  fabric  of society  is threatened.  Second,  governments  should  apply
those  measures  that  respect  voluntary  choice  before  moving  to  more
restrictive  measures. Although  this  principle  of gradualism  is  easy  to
state,  in  practice  it  may  be difficult  to  weigh  the  restrictiveness  of
various  measures,  particularly  when incentives  are  used in  combination  with
one  another.
Third,  any  measure  that  penalizes  children  for  being  the  nth  child
should  be avoided. This  follows  from  the  basic  ethical  principle  that
innocent  people  should  not  be penalized  for  the  behavior  of others. It is
buttressed  by the  rule  that  children  should  not  be harmed  if it  can  be
avoided. Most  specifically,  children  should  not  suffer  by the  accident  of
having  been  born later  than  their  siblings. Measures  that  deprive  children17
of health,  educational,  or other  benefits  solely  because  they  are  the
second  or third  child  are  objectionable.  How,  then,  do the  incentives
examined  above  fare  regarding  ethical  standards?  We now  cnosider  each  of
the  types  set  forth  at the  outset.
Acceptor  Payments
The  extent  to  which  monetary  or other  payments  infringe  upon  the
principle  of  voluntariness  depends,  in  large  measure,  upon  the  payment
amount  in  relation  to the  income  level  of the  recipient. The early  payments
for  sterilization  in India  and  elsewhere  were  justified  conceptually  as
compensation  for  time  lost  from  work,  transportation,  and  other  incidental
costs. Insofar  as the  payments  do,  in  fact,  cover  only  these  items,  they
can  justly  be seen  as reducing  a financial  barrier  and  enhancing  options  for
poor  people.
In  some  cases,  however,  the  "compensation"  amount  has  been  high
enough  to suggest  a subterfuge  to  avoid  anti-incentive  reactions.  Also,  in
some  countries  payments  may  serve  to induce  some  individuals  to  have a
sterilization  who  otherwise  would  not  have  done  so.  In this,  of course,
payments  affect  the  poor  disproportionately--a  modest  payment  can  be
coercive  to  a person  of limited  means  but  innocuous  to a  wealthy  person.
The  key  question  is: At what  point  does  the  acceptor's  payment  cease  to  be
a  relief  from  out-of-pocket  costs  and  become  an inducement?  Drawing  the
line  is  difficult  and  must  reflect  the  cultural  and  pecuniary  conditions  in
each  country. For  example,  an  evaluation  of the  Sri  Lankan  incentives
payments  concluded  that  500  rupees,  about  8  percent  of  per  capita  income,  or
a  month's  wage for  some  acceptors,  was  not  coercive,  although  higher18
payments  probably  would  be.
International  donor  agencies  have  had to grapple  with  this
difficult  issue. For  example  the  policy  of the  US Agency  for  International
Development  (AID)  states  that  "No  AID funds  can  be used to  pay  potential
acceptors  of sterilization  to induce  their  acceptance  of voluntary
sterilizatic..i."  It notes, however, that reasonable compensation for time
lost  from  work,  transportation,  food,  and  the  like  does  not  constitute  an
incentive.
Per-Case  Payments  to  Health  Personnel  and  Recruiters
Payments  to  providers  "by  the  case'  are  common  in  several  Asian
countries;  they  can  easily  lead  providers  to  promote  contraception.  Such
tendencies  are  probably  greatest  with  motivators,  and  with  recruiters,  who
may  act  more like  salespeople  to  bring  in  clients  to collect  a commission.
In these  cases  "motivation"  can  easily  lead  to  a "hard  sell"  approach,  with
diminished  regard  for  informed  consent  or  voluntarism.  Per-case  payments
can  be of particular  concern  where  targets  for  health  personnel  or
recruiters  are  established  and  inlividuals  not  meeting  their  targets  are
penalized.
Community  Incentives
Insofar  as they  benefit  communi-  ties,  providing  needed  funds  for
development  attivities  without  putting  undue  pressure  on individuals,
community  incentives  can  be viewed  as relatively  nonrestrictive  of  personal
freedom. However,  when  community  members  or their  leaders  apply  strong
pressure  on individuals  to  have  fewer  children  or to  practice  contraception19
so that  the  community  will  be eligible  for  a reward,  then  these  incentives
can  restrict  free  choice. Disincentives  may  also  come  into  play;  it  would
be unfortunate,  for  example,  if a  government  were  to  withhold  basic  services
as a punishment  for  low-performing  communities.  Thus,  community  measures
may  contain  the  seeds  of coercion,  and  safeguards  must  be considered.  It
should  be noted,  however,  that  peer  pressures  flowing  from  the  group
consensus  are  the  cultural  norm  in  many  Asian  societies  and  may  not  be
considered  coercive  by  members  of the  community  themselves.
Incentives  for  Small  Families
In  some  cases,  such  as the  long-term  bond schemes  practiced  on the
tea  plantations  of India  or the  educational  bond  experiment  in  Taiwan
(province  of China),  incentives  for  small  families  served  as  a kind  of old-
age  insurance  and  provided  an  alternative  to children  for  support  of elderly
parents. They  gave  positive  benefits  to  families  and  do not  appear  to  have
significantly  restricted  the  individual's  choice  of  family  size. Where  such
economic  benefits  can  be turned  into  penalties  later  on--for  example,  when
loans  made to small  families  must  be repaid  immediately  by couples  going
beyond  the  agreed  parity--then  they  are  more  restrictive  of individual
liberty.
Disincentives
Intended  to  penalize  individuals  who  do  not  comply  with
governmental  population  policy,  disincentives  are  meant  to  be harsher  than
the  positive  inducements  examined  earlier. On the  whole,  they  restrict
individual  choice  more  than  positive  incentives  do,  although  some  are  more20
severe  than  others. For  example,  loss  of a tax  exemption  after  the  nth
child  is  less  severe  than  loss  of  housing  priority,  if only  because  fewer
people  pay  taxes. Disincentives  would  appear  to  be justified  only  after
positive  incentives  have  not succeeded  and  when  a societal  consensus  exists
on such  means  of reducing  population  growth.
Discussion
A new  context  has emerged  for  the  discussion  of funding  methods
for  public  programs. Cost  pressures  have increased  at the  same  time  that
programs  have  grown;  many  developing  countries  are  in  worse  financial
straits  than  before. An argument  can  be made  for  consumers  to carry  a
greater  share  of the  costs,  but  other  considerations,  such  as restraining
population  growth,  argue  in  the  opposite  direction. It is  fair  to say  that
in  the  past  many  programs  appeared  to give  little  systematic  thought  to
their  structures  of charges,  payments,  and  incentives;  their  practices
developed  on an  ad  hoc  basis,  producing  some  of the  diversity  and
inconsistencies  seen  in the  present  data.
Now  both  governments  and  donors  are  scrutinizing  funding  issues,
including  cost  recovery  on one  side  and  stimuli  to contraceptive  use  on the
other. The  following  considerations  are  relevant  to the  current
discussions.
Affordability  to the  user.  Price  elasticity  is  not  known  for
contraceptives  offered  by public  programs  to  poor  populations,  but the
number  of contraceptive  users  will  presumably  decline  as the  price  per  unit
rises. Token  charges  may  enhance  the  perceived  value  of the  product  and
motivate  the  providing  personnel  if they  keep  a share,  but the  need  for  even21
a little  cash  in  hand  can  pose  a real  obstacle  to  purchasing  contraceptives
for  impoverished  villagers. The  most  affordable  item  is the  free  one; if
affordability  is a  high  priority,  contraceptives  should  be provided  free  and
exceptions  should  be made  only  for  reasons  that  clearly  outweigh  the
presumption  of  no charges.
Eqjity. The  poor  should  have  as ready  access  to  vital  services  as
those  who  are  not  poor.  Free  or subsidized  services,  as in social  marketing
programs,  help  achieve  this.  Some  countries  have in  effect  a dual  system,
providing  contraceptives  at a somewhat  higher  cost  through  the  social
security  network  or  commercial  outlets,  but  at lower  cost  through  the
Ministry  of Health. Variations  in  dual  systems  deserve  further  thought;
they  may aid  cost  recovery  and  help  cross-  subsidization  while  still
retaining  equity  and  affordability.
Reimbursement  justifications.  In  some  circumstances,  as  where
dire  poverty  exists,  clients  who  accept  sterilization  and  the  IUD  may  be
reimbursed  for  travel  costs  to  a medical  facility,  time  lost  from  work,
extra  foods,  and  so on.  If the  service  is  provided  free,  reimbursement
removes  a true  cost  obstacle. It  requires  greater  public  expense,  but it
increases  both  equity  and  affordability.  Economic  analyses  over  the  years
have  shown  a large  net  gain,  even  in  the  short  run,  from  the  investment  of
public  funds  in  contraceptive  services,  an argument  favoring  cost
reimbursements  to  clients  in cases  where  out-of-pocket  costs  constitute  a
significant  barrier  to  contraceptive  use.
Incentive  effects. In  countries  with anti-natalist  policies,
where  incentives  of one  type  or  another  are  acceptable  and  feasible,  the
question  arises  as to their  net  cost  to the  government.  Some  incentive22
measures  are  cost-free;  indeed,  some  immediately  save  the  government  money,
as with  cancellation  of tax  exemptions,  child  allowances,  and  maternity
leave  for  higher-order  births. Others,  such  as direct  payments  for
sterilization,  constitute  a  budget  outlay  and  increase  program  costs. 3
Countries  employing  the  latter  type  of incentives  have  decided  that  the
costs  are  offset  by savings  through  reduced  maternity  and  abortion  care,
fewer  children  to  educate,  and  so forth,  as  well  as  other  benefits  to the
society.
Critics  of incentives  and  disincentives  have  not  claimed  that  such
approaches  fail  to  yield  net  economic  returns  or that  they  fail  to  work.
Rather,  they  argue  that  the  measures  are  coercive  or,  citing  the  case  of
India  during  the  emergency,  are  unacceptable  to  society. Such  criticism
has led,  in  at least  one  case,  to the  withdrawal  of  donor  support. Reduced
funding  from  international  sources  is,  of cc.trse,  a real  cost,  so that  the
ethical  considerations  carry  over  to  objective  cost  calculations.  In two
instances,  at least  (Sri  Lanka  ar.d  Bangladesh),  other  controversies  have
focused  simply  on the  amount  of the  payment,  since  if it is  small  enough  it
is no longer  judged  by the  donor  to  be an incentive.
The  availability  of investment  capiRtl. While  analysis  may  show
sizeable  net  gains  from  investments  devoted  to  making  contraceptives  free  or
offering  payments  to  users,  funds  for  the  annual  budget  must  still  be
found. All  countries  possess  adequate  capital  to  enrich  a vigorous  family
planning  program  if that  were the  only  need. The  constraint  is  the  long
list  of competing  demands  for  limited  resources.  Here,  donors  can  assist  by
improved  analysis,  country  by country,  of the  flow  of costs  and  savings  from
alternative  financing  schemes  for  programs.23
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Incentive  Score  Changes  Over  Time.  Lapham  and  Mauldin  (1984,
1985)  measured  the  use  of incentives,  without  regard  as to the  amount,  as
one  of the  30  scores  they  developed  to assess  the  strength  of  program
effort. This  score  ranged  from  0 to  4  depending  upon  the  number  of parties
who  received  a payment  or other  benefit  linked  to contraceptive  acceptance:
the  client,  any  service  personnel,  the  recruiter,  or  the  community,  and  with
extra  credit  for  any  disincentive  that  encouraged  family  planning  or the
small  family. These  scores  were  for  the  reference  year 1982,  and  we have
calculated  comparable  scores  for  1987.
As regards  the  losses  and  gains  over  this  five-year  period,
overall  the  movement  is  upward,  with 11  countries  increasing  their  score,
and  only  two  decreasing.  The  upward  movement  is  sharpest  in  Asia,  where  7
of 13 responding  countries  reported  some  strengthening  as compared  to only  4
of the  21  countries  in the  rest  of the  world.
Nineteen  countries  had  scores  of 0 in  1982;  15  of these  remained
at 0, and  the  other  four  moved  only  slightly  upward. Thus there  is24
stability  at the  bottom. There  is also  stability  among  the  few  countries  or
economies  at the  top: of the  three  high-scoring  ones in  1982,  with scores
of 3  or more,  one  moved  fAurther  upward  (Bangladesh)  and  two (Indonesia  and
Taiwan,  province  of China)  remained  the  same. Furthermore,  four  countries
moved  sharply  upward  from  lower  levels: Korea,  Pakistan,  Liberia,  and
China,  with  Korea  and  China  moving  to the  maximum  score  of 4.
2  The investigation  by Lapham  and  Mauldin  (1984,  1985)  of the  same
100  countries  as in  our  study  (those  with  over  one  million  population)  asked
a few  questions  about  social  marketing  programs,  with  a 1982  reference
date. These  questions  were  replicated  in the  1987  questio  aaire  sent  to  the
100  countries  (see  text),  and  the  scoring  method  on social  marketing  was
repeated. Scores  ranged  from  0 to  4, depending  mainly  upon  the  percentage
of the  urban  population  covered  by the  social  marketing  program,  since  most
such  projects  are  directed  to the  urban  population. Extra  credit  was  also
given  if  the  program  extended  into  the  rural  area.
Of 30 country  questionnaires  with  usable  information,  22 received
identical  scores  in 1982  and  1987,  nearly  all  at zero  both  times. The
remainder  were  evenly  balanced,  with  five  receiving  better  scores  and  four
receiving  worse  scores  in 1987. This  suggests  little  change  in  the  global
picture;  however  there  are  interesting  cases  on  which  we have  little  or no
reliable  information.  These  include  Indonesia,  which  has  just  started  an
ambitious  program  with  condoms,  and  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  and  Ghana.
Bangladesh  stayed  at a score  of  4.0  over  the  period,  and  Nepal  improved  from
2.0  to  4.0.  Egypt,  which  has  an  active  social  marketing  program,  fell
slightly  from  2.7  to 2.0.  (There  is,  of  course,  a component  of error  in the25
data,  particularly  because  the  respondents  differed  on the  two  dates.)
3  This  applies  to  per-case  payments  to  providers  also,  but in  some
countries  these  are  used  simply  as a salary  substitute  and  not  as a  staff
incentive.
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Table I  Charges and Paymente to Contraceptlve Acceptors. PubiLc *ector
Charge  acceptor  fees  Neeithbe  charge nor pay  Pay acceptors
_aceotors  _
Methods  Methods  Methods
Region  Location  providedl'  Locatlon  provided&I  Locatlon  providdL'
Africa  Botsvana  All  Burkina Paso  St








Asia  Hong Kong  ALL  Bangladesh  O,In,C,S.D  Bangladesh  I,St
Korea, Rep. of  I,O,C  China  All  Indxa  I,St
Pakistan  O,C,S  Indla  Ab  Korea, Rep. of£'  St
Sri Lanka  O,C  IndonesLa  I,O,C,In  Nepal  St
Taiwan, China I,O,C,St  Korea, Rep. of  Ab#'  Pakistan  St
ThaLlandS. I,O,C,In,St  Nepal  I,O,C,S,D,In  Sri Lanka  St
Singapore  ALL  Philippines  All
Srl Lanka  I.In
Latin America  Peiut'  All  Colombia  Ail




Middle East  Jordan  I  Egypt  I,O,C,D,S




a.  Codes for methods are:  I - IUD; 0 - oralss C - condoms; S - spermicides; D - diaphragms
In - injwctables; St - sterilization (male and female); Ab a  abortion.
b.  Governme-t program.
c.  The ThLland  program officially provides contraceptives free except lnjectables;
hovever, in practice, many acceptors are  charged.
d.  Only menstrual regulation for lov-income  vomen.
*.  Payment made only to lov-income  acceptors:  US$330 so acceptors vith one child,
US$110 to acceptors with two children, and US$45 to acceptors vith three or more children.
f.  MLnistry of Health.  No charges Ln the Social Security system.28
Table  2  Per-Case Payments to Pamily Pl-nning Personnel,  1987  or Most  Recent  Year
Per-case  mayments
No per-case  Orala  IUD  Female sterilizatton














Asia  Burma  Philippines  M,N  Bangladesh  NM,NO  India  0
China  Taivan, China  M,N,O  Korea, Rep. of  M  Bangladesh  M,N,O
Hong Kong  Sri Lanka  if  Nepal  H,N  Korea, Rep..  of  M
Laos  Philippines  M,N  Nepal  M
Singapore  Taivan, China  0  Philippines  N.M
Thailand  Taivan, China  0
PakLstan  M,N,O
Sri Lanka  MN.NO
Latin America  Bolivia  Perukl  O  Perukl  O







Middle East  Iraq  Egypt'  MN,N,O  Egyptll  M,N,O
Jordan
Turkey
a.  ProvLder codes are:  M - medical doctorsa N - nurses  andlor midwives: 0 - others.
b.  IPPF affiliates (Instituto  Peruano de Paternidad Responsable).
C.  1984 data.24
Table  3  Social  Marketing  Prices  (La U5t).  by  Method
Price  In USS
Region  Location (and Yoer)  Orals  Condoms  Speraicide  Injectables  ORS&/  IUD
to  pone  cyle)  (docon  toor *olication)  (one nacket)
Africa  Egypt  (1966)  .24  .28  .35  1.92
Ghana  (1987)  .11  .21  .01
Nigeria (1966)  .25  .60  .04
Asia  Bangaldesh  (1966)  .03..13  .0S_12_15  .01  .32  .09
aong tong  (1936)  .32  1.03  1.03.1.28
Indla  (1985)  .12  .12-19
Indonesia  (1967)  .46
Malaysia  (1986)  .32  .36  5.00
Nepal  (1916)  .12  .28  .02  .05
Pakistan  (1966)  .12
Sri Lank&  (k985)  .09,.13  .1S.5S  .32
Taiwan. China  (1986)  .50  .3S
Thailand  (1985)  .19 .26 .33  .36,.46 .64
Latin Ameriea  Barbados  (1984)  1.26  3.00
and the  Bolivia  (1966)  .25  .25
Caribbean  El Salvador  (1963)  .40  1.36  .03
Guatemala  (1963)  .61  2.08  .09
Honduras  (1966)  .73  2.46
Jamaica  (1967)  .18  .44
Mexico  (1965)  .37  2.64,3.96,.516  1.40  4.35
Colombia  (1966)  .20-.40  .46  .10
(PROVANILIA)
Ntoe:  Two or  ore numbors  In one call denotes multiple brands.
a.  Oral rohydratlon Salts
Sources%  Much of the above  Information  is provided courtesy of the Social Marketing  Forum, which
regularly iLsues price data and made some figures available prior to publication.  Data for 1984
and 1985 are from J. D. SherriL et &L., PopulatLon Reports,  Serics J-30 (July-August 1985).  Other
information comes from the 1987 qLestionnaire  described  In tho text.in
rigure  1
Charges  to  Oral Contraceptive  Acceptors
0.60  (per cycle).  1983-87
0.60  0.10
IO-  050









0.00  0  .00  0.00  0.00  0.000.M









'A'-,:.  ~  ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  - I
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~04U.S.  dollars  U.S.  aolkors
o  e  - - PJ  P0  4.~~~O  t  4-  ab  Lo  -o,.-  (A&.  J-  -O&  *
o  ut  o  ett  o  .e  o  a,.  o  a,  o  OOC888o  oo  oo  o  oo0o  o*,  o  o 
~~~  4.52  ~~~~~~~Tatum  r
Chilo\\\v5  G,>;i3\\i*.31Stz_|X| 
Coct  4IZvare  -.  2.67  4.  Q
£tbiopia  2.41  -long K_\
St1  apoce  2.3t  ._
Nlg.tt  ~  \  \  \  \  \  \  \  \  \  2.00  3  Ssnppo\O
Sotav\na  1\\\  1.58  c  4%.
Bollivia  1.48  3hied1
pan.s"  140
Ta_Van  1.25  -o
lbxtoo  \  \  X \  \  1. s  11
tpu&b1ic of  :
Koreals  f  ;\\\\\1  1.04  *  P  hxf.coe  IA
Tuiley  1.00  *  O
P,rtoeco  0.96  i  O  Morocco?o
Jorda  ~  \\>10.55  _ Peru.  0.61
$sWd=  0.41 
?akt-taa  0.30  tD  N  t'
NPiri.  9  0.25  a  (b
StWuil  0.23  Z  Sadeab  2.
ColoubSi  0.21  -.
Itndomossa  0.19  4 
Theiland  0. Is....,
Sri  lenb.  0.  Si
Ibpal  - ]  0.09  Sri  LAkIt  0a
yPt  - J  0.07.0  -0
engidt  __  __  0.05  -publ_  o__  _  _f_O__________
logop  lef  -U.S.  dolloas
U.S. dollars
-~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~  N  _'  _  _  1.U  0  N  tON  h 
0  o  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0000  000  00  0000  0
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Cot  d'lvoire 
Peru  U'  Puerto Rlco  150.00
to \\\\\\\\\\\lui  Singapore  . 71.16
Jordan  Jordan  \  71.00
0\\\\\\\\\\ M  -3  Hong  Kong  *  64.10
Hong Kong  \c  Pru
Srcall  &\\\\\\\\\\21  o~~L  fr  Sr21  13  00  13:
0W-
0  Suan306
Puerto  Rico  0  _.
Sn  Burkina  Faso  - 30.00
Singapore  U
Pan "  1  o  Taiwan  20.00
Bolivia  clo  9  15.00  o 
X N N N O  ~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~  ~~~~to  T urkty  ISA1.0  * 
Talwan  Ethiopia  114.49
Republic  Sotno  14.1 
Korea  'ollvi  12.31
b  (D  Republic of  11.61
Mexico  --  ao.9C9
U  (A  N  Ira  9  .53
Liberia  - 0  Pararny  3."
0
Thaland  Togo  3.33
In,  Colo*S  "  2.89
NolooS  oPbilippine  2.44 Colombia  n
Is  ~~~~~~~~~~  ~~~~~~~Thaliand  0.64
Turkey  Indonelsi  0.1?PPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS70  Vocational  Education  and  Economic
Environments:  Conflict  or
Convergence?  Arvil  V.  Adams  August  1988  T.  Hawkins
Antoine  Schwartz  33678
WPS71  School  Effects  on Student  Achievement
In  Nigeria  and Swaziland  Marlaine  Lockheed  August  1988  T.  Hawkins
Andre  Komenan  33678
.PS72  The  Relative  Efficiency  of  Public
Schools  In  Developing  Countries  Emmanuel  Jimenez  August  1988  T.  Hawkins
Marlalne  Lockheed  33678
Vicente  Paqueo
WPS73  Taxation  and  Output  Growth  In  Africa  Jonathan  Skinner  August  1988  A.  Bhalila
60359
WPS74  Fiscal  Stabilization  and  Exchange  Rate
Instability:  A Theoretical  Approach
and  Some  Policy  Conclusions  Using
Mexican  Data  Andrew  Feltenstein  August  1988  A. Bhalla
Stephen  Morris  60359
WPS75  Welfare  Dxominance  and  the  Design  of
Excise  Taxation  in  the  Cote  dlIvoire  Shlomo  Yitzhaki  August  1988  A. Bhalla
Wayne  Thirsk  60359
WPS76  On the  Shadow  Price  of  a  Tax
Inspector  Shlomo  Yitzhaki
Yitzhak  Vakneen
WPS77  Incentive  Policies  and  Agricultural
Performance  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  Bela  Balassa  August  1988  N. Campbell
33769
WPS78  Economists,  Institutions  and  Trade
Restrictions:  A  Review  Article  J.  Michael  Finger
WPS79  Quantitative  Appraisal  of
Adjustment  Lending  Bela  Balassa  August  1988  N.  Campbell
33769
WPS80  Emerging  Issues  of  Privatization
and  the  Public  Sector  Samuel  Paul  September  1988  E.  Madrona
61711PPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS81  Reaching  People  at  the  Periphery:
Can  the  World  Bank's  Population,
Health,  and  Nutrition  Operations
Do  Better?  Rlchard  Heaver  September  1988  S. Ainswort
31091
WPS82  Microeconomic  Theory  of the  House-
hold  and  Nutrition  Programs  Dov  Chernichovsky  September  1988  S.  Ainsworth
Linda  Zangwill  31091
WPS83  Welfare  Costs  of  U.S.  Quo+as  In
Textiles,  Steel,  and  Autos  Jaime  de  Melo  September  1988  C.  Cabana
David  Tarr  61539
WPS84  Black  Markets  for  Foreign  Exchange,
Real  Exchange  Rates  and Inflation:
Overnight  vs.  Gradual  Reform  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa  Brian  Pinto  September  1988  R. Blade-Chare
33754
WPS85  Wage  Responsiveness  and  Labor  Market
Disequilibrium:  Exploring  the
Components  of  Open  Unemployment  Ramon  E. Lopez
Luis  A. Riveros
WPS86  External  Balance,  Fiscal  Policy  and
Growth  in  Turkey  Ritu  Anand
Ajay  Chhibber
Sweder  van  Wijnbergen
WPS87  Vocational  and  Technical  Education
in  Peru  Peter  R.  Moock
Rosemary  T.  Bellew
WPS88  Costs,  Payments,  and Incentives  In
Family  Planning  Programs  John  A.  Ross  September  1988  S.  Ainsworth
Stephen  L. Isaacs  31091
WPS89  Export  Quota  Allocations,  Export
Earnings  and  Market  Diversifications  Taeho  Bark  September  1988  C.  Cabana
Jaime  de  Melo  61539
WPS90  A  Framework  for  Analysis  of Mineral
Tax  Policy  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  Robert  F.  Conrad  September  1988  A.  BhalIla
Zmarak  M.  Shalizi  60359
WPS91  Israel's  Stabilization  Program  Nissan  Liviatan  September  1988  N. ilviatan
61763